Beijing — 

When I began covering US-China relations as a young journalist in the late 1990s, the sticking points between the two countries, especially when it came to high-level meetings, were often summarized as the three Ts: Tiananmen, Tibet and Taiwan.

The first two Ts referred to the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters and the Beijing-controlled Himalayan region once ruled by the exiled Dalai Lama, respectively – both tied to China’s human rights record.

Fast forward to the latest talks in Beijing between President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping this week: Almost a decade has passed since Trump’s last visit – Joe Biden never made it here during his presidency – and the themes for such summits have evolved to see a different trio of Ts emerge on top of the agenda: tariffs, technology and Taiwan (with the addition of Tehran as the fourth T this time).

While Taiwan, the island democracy that Beijing claims as its own, remains in the “most important” category from China’s perspective, other priorities have shifted from values-based issues to trade and economy.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, once a passionate critic of China’s human rights record and sanctioned by Beijing for his stance, has become much quieter on the topic as America’s top diplomat. Instead, the cabinet secretary taking the lead on steering the world’s most consequential bilateral ties has been Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who met his Chinese counterpart in Seoul ahead of the summit in Beijing.

The transformed dynamic takes hold as Xi, China’s most powerful Communist leader since the death of Chairman Mao Zedong five decades ago, continues to tighten his grip on every aspect of the country, reshaping its economy and military with unconstrained political will and state resources – a hallmark of a one-party system.

But the global geopolitical landscape in which the US-China relationship finds itself today, is also in no small part the result of Trump’s own doing, which many argue has tilted to Beijing’s favor.

It started during his first term but has intensified since he returned to the White House in early 2025. By now Trump may find it hard to shake his nickname on Chinese social media: “Nation-Building Trump” – a not-so-subtle jab at his alleged ability to prop up China on the world stage through his actions.

By upending decades-old international trade norms and security alliances – not to mention launching a war with Iran that seems to have benefited almost no one – Trump is seen by many to have helped China score not only strategically but even morally.

Leaders from US adversaries and allies alike are flocking to Beijing to strengthen or mend ties with China, while opinions around the world – even Americans’ – warm up to Xi’s China as shown in multiple recent surveys.

The Chinese public, bombarded with official messaging and state media coverage on the chaos and divisions unleashed by Trump at home and abroad, appears more convinced of the US being a declining empire bent on stopping China’s rise.

It may be a cliché to say that China benefits anytime the US is mired in another quagmire in the Middle East, or anywhere outside the Indo-Pacific region. But clichés have factual foundations: the Iran war has diverted US focus and resources – notably depleting its munitions at a time when China controls the global supply of rare earths, essential for weapons production.

With oil prices still fluctuating, China’s stockpile and, more importantly, its early and hard pivot to green energies make it better shielded from the short-term turmoil than most. That could translate into bargaining power at the negotiating table with Trump almost certain to ask Xi to do more to pressure Iran, one of Beijing’s closest partners.

Aside from the impact of the Strait of Hormuz blockade, China is indeed facing other economic headwinds – from self-defeating price wars in its manufacturing and service sectors, to stubbornly weak domestic consumption and still-high youth employment. Throw in a demographic crisis marked by low birth rates, Xi’s hands may seem tied – but he could still easily spend billions to buy American agricultural products and Boeing jets to let Trump tout “deliverables” from the summit ahead of US mid-term elections.

And the “Board of Trade” idea that’s been floated by Trump officials to manage bilateral trade? The Chinese are masters of sprawling bureaucracies – with well over 7 million civil servants – setting up one more council at the US request may just be a “win-win.”

What Xi won’t touch is anything structural – precisely what Washington has long alleged to give Beijing unfair trade advantages.

Despite US export controls, China has been making major progress on multiple fronts – again, partly due to its top-down system that guarantees policy and money being directed to where Xi wants, but also partly due to Trump’s actions (cutting research funding and making the US less welcoming, for instance, have led to the return of Chinese talent who once worked in American labs and companies).

Whether it’s Chinese electric vehicles or humanoid robots, underneath all the viral videos of Batmobile-looking cars and break-dancing droids lies a steadfast march toward less dependence on fossil fuels in the face of climate change (and war-induced oil shocks) and automated workforce to counter a shrinking labor pool.

Trump likes to boast of his friendship with Xi, but the Chinese strongman is not known to be the sentimental kind, having sacked plenty of longtime protégés and allies since taking power well over a decade ago – most recently axing his top general who was supposed to be a childhood friend amid a sweeping purge of the 2 million-strong military.

Even counting flaws that come with the system and his decisions that have unnerved some China watchers, however, time is on Xi’s side. When the ruling Communist Party holds its next national congress in the fall of 2027, he is widely expected to assume a precedent-breaking fourth term. He will be 74 – and still younger than either Trump 2.0 or Biden when they took office.