Xi Jinping’s New Economic, Political Strategies Don’t Match

Ahead of this year’s Two Sessions, the weeklong meeting of China’s largely rubber-stamp parliament that started on March 4, President Xi Jinping released another volume of his speeches—this time on what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) calls the “correct view of political performance,” a concept that has become the centerpiece of an ongoing campaign to redefine how officials are judged.

The timing is highly suggestive. For months, Beijing has been urging cadres across the country to rethink the meaning of bureaucratic success. Yet even a leader as powerful as Xi sometimes struggles to persuade China’s vast administrative machinery to move in the direction he prefers.

Xi and China’s bureaucracy face a classic principal-agent dilemma. The center sets priorities. Local officials implement them. Their incentives do not always align.

Why now? What makes the current moment unusual is the urgency. For most of the reform era, the system relied on a brutally simple organizing principle: GDP growth. Local officials understood the rules: Deliver rapid expansion, and promotion would follow. As long as growth targets were met, other problems could be deferred or absorbed. Debt accumulation, environmental degradation, speculative construction, and even bouts of social unrest could be tolerated so long as the growth machine kept running.

The model produced immense distortions. It also produced results. China’s economy surged forward, lifting hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty and transforming the country into a global industrial powerhouse. But that formula has reached its limits. High-speed growth has become harder to sustain and less desirable to pursue.

Beijing now frames its economic strategy around structural transformation and, critically, a pivot toward domestic demand as China confronts a post-property market fiscal and tax restructuring, macroeconomic recovery, and heightened external tensions all at once. Meanwhile, the old industrial machine continues to churn out excessive capacity, eroding profits through deflationary price wars and further intensifying external trade tensions.

The difficulty lies in translating those ambitions into bureaucratic incentives. GDP once offered a clear metric to evaluate performance. The new agenda revolves around longer horizons and softer objectives. “Investment in people” and “high-quality development” resist simple measurement. Officials still need something tangible to chase.

In fact, Xi’s newly compiled speeches reveal that he has long been uneasy about the distortions of GDP worship. As early as 2013, he warned that officials could no longer be judged solely by economic growth rates. China, he argued, had to abandon the mentality of producing quick political achievements that “drain the pond to catch the fish.”

Yet Xi’s writings also help explain why building a new evaluation system has proved so difficult. They show that he expects local officials to satisfy three simultaneous demands that frequently pull in different directions.

The first is strict political compliance. In the reform era, local officials enjoyed room to adapt central directives to local realities. That space has narrowed considerably. Xi has emphasized that strategic decisions made by the CCP Central Committee must be implemented without deviation or modification. Both under-implementation and excessive zeal can be treated as political mistakes.

The second expectation involves tech upgrading. Beijing still wants economic dynamism. The leadership has reframed growth around the concept of “new quality productive forces.” Officials are encouraged to cultivate advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence, green technologies, and other frontier industries. China’s next stage of development, Xi has argued, depends on innovation and industrial transformation.

The third expectation focuses on systemic security. Beijing increasingly treats financial risk and local government debt as threats to long-term stability. This concern is rooted in the legacy of past decades, when growth incentives pushed local governments to finance aggressive investment sprees through off-balance-sheet borrowing vehicles. Many of these projects—industrial parks, infrastructure, and sprawling real estate developments—boosted headline GDP but left behind heavy liabilities and underused assets. Officials are reminded that borrowing and investment decisions will be audited long after they leave office. Xi has repeatedly warned against reckless projects that leave behind large debts and unfinished infrastructure, explicitly criticizing cadres who “rack up a mountain of debt, pat their butts, and walk away, securing promotions all the way up,” demanding that “officials leaving their office must be audited and accountability must be pursued for life.”

Each of these priorities makes sense on its own. Together, they create a bureaucratic trilemma in which officials can realistically satisfy only two of the three.

Innovation requires risk-taking. Building new industries involves large investments, uncertain returns, and tolerance for failure. Achieving innovation while containing financial risk would require financing mechanisms beyond China’s state-dominated banking system, such as private capital participation, co-investment structures, or venture-style funding. Yet these approaches often fall outside the safest interpretation of existing rules and therefore sit uneasily with strict political compliance.

If local officials prioritize risk control and strict adherence to central directives, development becomes deeply risk-averse, and experimentation suffers. If they push technological upgrading through aggressive investment or creative financing, they risk future audits uncovering hidden liabilities or procedural violations, the worst nightmare for a Chinese bureaucrat. If they pursue innovation while staying within existing government financing rules, the burden often falls back onto local government balance sheets, increasing fiscal pressure and undermining financial stability.

In practice, Xi’s imperatives rarely coexist comfortably, a tension further intensified by the chilling effect of his anti-corruption campaign. The result is predictable. Xi gave this phenomenon a nickname: the bureaucratic version of “lying flat.” The term describes a survival strategy that pairs visible political loyalty with minimal initiative.

Xi has repeatedly complained about this bureaucratic paralysis, mocking such bureaucrats as “fence-sitters” and taunting them as fearing “the more dishes you wash, the more bowls you break.” In January 2021, at a plenum of the CCP’s top disciplinary body, his frustration boiled over: “Some officials won’t lift a finger until the Central Committee issues a written directive; without one, they do absolutely nothing. My written instructions are meant to be the absolute last line of defense. Are you telling me that if I don’t personally issue a directive, the work just grinds to a halt?”

Yet the incentive structure continues to reward caution. Caution, however, does not always mean doing nothing. Sometimes it means doing too much of the wrong thing. When officials feel pressure to show results, the response can swing in the opposite direction. Local leaders rush into politically favored sectors that signal alignment with central priorities. The result is an intensified form of GDP-style competition. Provinces and municipalities pile into the same high-technology industries, producing waves of redundant projects and wasted capital that are extremely difficult to unwind. Xi himself warned about this pattern in 2020, noting that blind investment in sectors such as semiconductors, electric vehicles, and renewable energy had already produced abandoned projects.

Beijing recognizes the tension. Xi has attempted to soften it through institutional adjustments, including a principle known as the “Three Distinctions,” intended to separate honest mistakes in reform from deliberate violations of discipline: errors made while experimenting without precedent, missteps in exploratory initiatives not yet clearly restricted by higher authorities, and unintended mistakes made in pursuit of development—distinct from violations driven by personal gain. Officials, at least in principle, are encouraged to act boldly in pursuit of innovation.

Yet these assurances compete with a powerful disciplinary system and the reality of retrospective accountability. Few cadres are willing to wager their careers on ambiguous promises of leniency.

Occasionally, however, local initiative still breaks through. One recent example offers a glimpse of what that energy can produce. In Jiangsu province, an amateur city soccer league has unexpectedly become one of the country’s most vibrant cultural phenomena. Known online as the “Su Super League,” the competition pits teams from the province’s 13 cities against one another. Players come from all walks of life: teachers, students, delivery drivers, office workers.

The spectacle has exploded in popularity. Stadiums are filling with tens of thousands of spectators. Online audiences stretch into the hundreds of millions. The deeper appeal lies in local identity. Jiangsu, like other provinces, has strong subregional cultures and a long tradition of rivalry among its cities that found a new expression on the soccer pitch.

Local governments quickly recognized the opportunity. Cities began linking matches with tourism promotions, restaurant campaigns, and cultural festivals. Ticket stubs unlocked discounts for hotels, shopping districts, and attractions. During a recent holiday period, several host cities reported notable surges in tourism consumption tied directly to the tournament.

The experiment illustrates the economic potential of bureaucratic creativity. Only local officials deeply familiar with Jiangsu’s subregional culture could tap into it and design the right mix of tourism and commercial incentives. A centrally designed policy would not have achieved the same effect. Local cadres, shrewd and career-minded, also understand Xi’s well-known interest in soccer and know how to frame initiatives in ways that are likely to win central approval.

These examples are instructive. Reviving domestic demand is the top challenge Xi has yet to crack. China’s consumer economy varies sharply across regions and industries, making local experimentation indispensable. That, in turn, requires a bureaucracy that feels empowered rather than paralyzed.

So, is it in Xi’s interest to empower them? Paradoxically, doing so may not conflict with his broader goals for the bureaucracy as much as it appears. Technology industries ultimately depend on consumers. Firms need profitable markets to sustain research and development. A vibrant consumer economy would strengthen the very innovation ecosystem Beijing hopes to build.

However, the question is, what happens if political discipline and loyalty remain central to Xi’s governing vision, as they clearly do? Can he tolerate a more confident bureaucracy? The answer is complex and defies easy resolution. Yet the alternative carries risks of its own. A system that rewards performative loyalty while discouraging initiative breeds quiet resentment. Chinese political discourse even has a term for officials who publicly profess loyalty while privately hedging their behavior: “two-faced people,” something Xi himself

In the end, Xi confronts his own version of the incentive problem he seeks to solve. The leadership wants a bureaucracy that can do everything at once—an impossible tension. Whether that bind loosens will depend on how much experimentation officials are actually allowed to escape the trilemma. Until then, caution will remain the default. Xi should not be surprised if calls to boost domestic demand once again fall on deliberately inattentive bureaucratic ears.

Visited 1 times, 1 visit(s) today

Related Article

Noah Donohoe inquest live: Search team priority was Cavehill in case schoolboy had fallen

Widow of former NI Secretary backs call for local lung cancer screening as region only part of UK without programme – The Irish News

The widow of the former Northern Ireland Secretary James Brokenshire has joined a campaign to introduce a lung cancer screening programme. Mr Brokenshire died from lung cancer in 2021, having previously served as Northern Ireland Secretary between 2016-18. Visiting Hillsborough Castle with medical experts to meet the current secretary, Chris Bryant, Cathy Brokenshire said she

Traffic was temporarily suspended over the Crimean Bridge after an attack. (AFP)

Crimean Bridge traffic halted after third Ukrainian attack in a week, Russian official says

Traffic was temporarily suspended over the Crimean Bridge after an attack, Sergei Aksyonov, Crimea’s Russian-installed governor, said on Telegram on Thursday, adding that assessment of the damage was underway. Traffic was temporarily suspended over the Crimean Bridge after an attack. (AFP) Also read | Vietnam jails ‘Shark Tank’ investor Nguyen Hoa Binh for 10 years

Can UnitedHealth Group Stock Crash From Here?

Image from Pixabay For questions about this article or underlying research, email help@trefis.com. UnitedHealth Group (UNH) stock returned 24.3% over the past twelve months, compared with 10.3% for the S&P 500. Anyone buying the shares after that run is counting on the insurer’s profits to keep recovering. For that to happen, UnitedHealthcare must keep medical

Zhongji Innolight Chairman Proposes Up to 4 Billion Yuan Share Buyback

End-of-day quote 2026-11-18 5-day change 1st Jan Change 396.30 CNY +0.84% -26.88% -35.03% Published on 11/18/2026 at 07:28 pm EST MT Newswires This article is reserved for our members. Log in to continue Log inCreate an account 07:28pm Zhongji Innolight Chairman Proposes Up to 4 Billion Yuan Share Buyback MT Nov. 18 China AI stocks,

Markel Adds $2.5 Billion to Share Repurchase Program

Market Closed – 04:00:02 2026-11-18 pm EST 5-day change 1st Jan Change 1,940.17 USD -0.89% -1.68% -9.74% Published on 11/18/2026 at 04:57 pm EST MT Newswires This article is reserved for our members. Log in to continue Log inCreate an account 04:57pm Markel Adds $2.5 Billion to Share Repurchase Program MT Oct. 29 Markel Group

Stock Market Correction: 1 Investing Move I’m Avoiding Right Now

I believe AI poses a significant market risk, but I’m not selling my technology stocks. By Reuben Gregg Brewer – Nov 18, 2026 at 3:15PM EST The number one thing I don’t want to do, at any time and for any reason, is change my long-term investment approach to fit the current market zeitgeist. It

Who speaks for Europe abroad? Not its top diplomat | World news

Who speaks for Europe abroad? Not its top diplomat | World news

The EU, we are repeatedly told, wants (and needs) to be a global player, a geopolitical heavyweight capable of shaping its own foreign and security policies – or at the very least, speaking with one clear, unambiguous voice on the world stage. Last Friday’s summit in Dublin, when leaders debated who should represent the bloc

Is Micron Undervalued? | The Motley Fool

A record year and a 38% slide have left Micron trading at a price usually reserved for shrinking businesses. By John Ballard – Nov 18, 2026 at 3:21PM EST Key Points Micron’s stock has pulled back sharply even after the best year in its history. Management expects memory to stay in short supply for the

New York City police officers are on duty outside the Lotte Palace Hotel during a United Nations General Assembly leaders reception, late Tuesday, Sept. 22, 2026, in New York. (AP Photo/Julia Demaree Nikhinson)

Family of Ecuadorian Killed in New York Building Collapse Receives His Remains

QUITO, Ecuador (AP) — The remains of one of two Ecuadorian construction workers killed when a building collapsed into an adjacent pit that was being excavated in New York were returned Wednesday to his home in Quisapincha, high in the country’s central Andean region. Relatives received the body of José Caguana, 26, in the rural

Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood

Police forces in England and Wales to be restructured into local commands

The move has drawn comparisons with the pre-war structure of policing in England and Wales. Enjoy your favourite LBC shows with ad-free Catch Up, weekly competition entries and an exclusive newsletter. Subscribe to LBC Catch Up Plus from £4.99 a month Police forces in England and Wales to be restructured into local commands. Picture: PA

Fujian courts Hong Kong travel trade with new tourism offerings and air links

Improved high-speed rail connectivity between Hong Kong and China is making Fujian province more accessible to Hong Kong travellers, prompting tourism authorities to strengthen travel trade partnerships and promote destinations beyond Wuyishan. The Fujian Provincial Department of Culture and Tourism and Nanping City Culture and Tourism Bureau recently hosted 80 travel agents from Hong Kong’s

Weekly share repurchase program transaction details

Amsterdam, November 18, 2026 SBM Offshore reports the transaction details related to its EUR227 million (US$270 million1) share repurchase program for the period November 12, 2026 through November 18, 2026. The repurchases were made under the EUR227 million share repurchase program announced on February 26, 2026 and effective from February 27, 2026. The objective of

2 of the Most Scenic Railway Routes in the World are in the UK

Here at Time Out, we need no convincing that the UK has some picture-perfect rail routes. From Jacobite steam trains to mountain-climbing tracks, we’ve even got our own ranking of the best scenic train journeys these islands have to offer.  Now, there’s even more reason to shout about the country’s rail infrastructure. Travel company Viva

Five Below vs. Uber Technologies: Which Consumer Stock Is a Better Buy for 2027?

Five Below’s aggressive store push and Uber’s global platform scale pull in very different directions, and the valuation gap may tip the balance for 2027. By Brendan Coffey – Updated Nov 18, 2026 at 10:50AM EST Key Points Five Below is leveraging an aggressive store expansion strategy to capture more of the teen and tween

Why the Anthropic IPO could be a trap for investors

Anthropic’s IPO is Wall Street’s Black Friday doorbuster. But IPO history says whatever you grab on day one usually goes on sale later. Anthropic (ANT) is expected to price its shares Wednesday evening and start trading Thursday on the Nasdaq. Orders reportedly came in at nearly seven times the shares on offer, and the top

0
Would love your thoughts, please comment.x
()
x