President Donald Trump’s suggestion that he would likely delay his planned state visit to Beijing by “a month or so” to focus on the war with Iran underscores the fragility of the U.S.-Chinese truce that has held since October. Expectations of a U.S.-Chinese thaw had resurfaced in recent months as both sides worked toward a summit, reduced tariffs and carried out a series of good-faith measures like delaying implementation of export controls. But Trump’s March 15 call for China to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz before his state visit illustrated how quickly external events can reshape the bilateral agenda.
Both the White House and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs later denied any formal linkage between the visit and Trump’s request. Yet the fact that a crisis in the Middle East can disrupt even a carefully prepared summit underscores a deeper reality: The current truce is structurally fragile and U.S.-Chinese relations remain highly susceptible to exogenous shocks. None of the fundamental sources of political, economic and security mistrust that have driven the deterioration in ties in recent years have been meaningfully addressed. Both sides have strong incentives to avoid all-out economic warfare for the time being, but the current tactical stabilization is a brittle check on future escalation. Another rupture is likely before the end of Trump’s term and will escalate beyond tariffs to include weaponizing supply chains – from semiconductors to critical minerals – that both sides view as strategic vulnerabilities.
Beijing and Washington in the past year have repeatedly come close to major escalation. In 2025, a tit-for-tat tariff battle pushed duties to levels approaching a trade embargo and spilled over to export controls and threats of visa denials. Temporary stabilizations followed leader-level interventions, but repeated cycles of escalation – in April and October – highlight how fragile the relationship has become.
The latest truce has held since October, with both sides scrambling to advance relations with a hastily arranged Trump state visit to China. The White House had previously announced it would begin on March 31 for three days, and has continued to negotiate commercial agreements, including a potential trade framework similar to those recently negotiated with more than two dozen countries, in advance of the trip.
Speculation about a new “grand bargain” echoes the January 2020 Phase One Trade Agreement, signed shortly before the global spread of COVID-19 mangled international trade and supply chains. That agreement was cast as a first step in that it deliberately focused on a narrow set of low-hanging fruit – such as commitments around agricultural purchase and strengthening intellectual property rights – with promises to quickly move into negotiating a broader “phase two” that would address the deeper structural issues around China’s industrial policies. But if even that narrow deal proved too difficult to enforce – core provisions, such as purchase commitments by China, remain unmet – there is little reason to expect that a broader framework from this summit will prove more durable.
Six years later, U.S.-Chinese dynamics are also, of course, far different. China has grown more confident in using its dominant control of many critical supply chains to inflict pain and bring Washington to the table – in 2025, it was the only country to meaningfully strike back at U.S. tariffs. The United States likewise has massively expanded its arsenal of economic statecraft tools – especially technology controls and investment restrictions – against China.
Both sides sit atop chokepoints on the other’s economy. For the United States, it’s semiconductors and related manufacturing equipment, software, high-performance specialty chemicals, aircraft parts, other advanced technologies and global financial infrastructure; for China, it’s critical minerals, active pharmaceutical ingredients and inputs across a wide range of supply chains. Both countries are working to reduce these vulnerabilities through a variety of decoupling and friendshoring initiatives, but for now, the two can still exact significant pain on the other.
Thus, the implications of failed U.S.-Chinese trade negotiations in 2026 extend far beyond the higher costs borne by tariffs. Both countries retain significant intent and capability to implement potentially crippling blows across a range of each other’s strategic sectors by denying the critical inputs they require to function. Beijing and Washington understand this, and fear of mutual harm – rather than an attempt to address the deeply rooted sources of mistrust – is driving the sustained truce and hurried negotiations. Much like the United States and the Soviet Union periodically sought détente to reduce mutual risk, so too do the United States and China today. But negotiating while facing a cocked gun does little to build confidence or shift relations in a positive trajectory.
China’s growing confidence is also likely to manifest itself in trade negotiation outcomes. Any deal announced at or soon after Trump’s trip will be far more even-keeled than the 2020 agreement and require concessions from the United States, such as lowering restrictions on Chinese investments in strategic U.S. sectors. The United States has already signaled its openness to concessions, with some recent reversals on restricting Chinese participation in the U.S. telecommunications sector, easing of some export controls on advanced AI semiconductors and a deal to allow TikTok to remain operating in the United States.
These measures, however, are limited and largely reflect tactical positioning ahead of negotiations rather than a broader shift in U.S. strategy. Since the October truce, the United States has continued to tighten pressure on China through other channels: it has encouraged Canada and Mexico to increase tariffs against China; it has accelerated efforts with other countries to reduce supply chain dependencies on China, especially in critical minerals; and it has continued sending warships on routine transits through the Taiwan Strait and East and South China Seas. Beijing strongly objected to all these measures, but they represent enduring U.S. economic and national security priorities that are unlikely to change as part of any trade framework. Any U.S. concessions offered in the context of a summit are therefore more likely to be limited and reversible rather than indicative of a broader strategic realignment.
The delayed trip, if and when it happens, may still not proceed as planned. The most recent threat to the truce is the burgeoning Iran conflict and its related energy disruptions – China imports more than half its crude oil from the Middle East – but China has similarly objected to U.S. moves in Venezuela, Greenland, and Panama, which threaten Chinese interests and have provoked rhetorical condemnations from Beijing. The U.S. Congress, likewise, has continued despite the truce to pass multiple pieces of legislation Beijing strongly objects to, such as the BIOSECURE Act, which directly challenges one of Beijing’s priority industrial sectors by seeking to restrict U.S. public and private sector cooperation with Chinese biotechnology firms. China itself must also navigate a sensitive political situation in that Trump likely expects to be regaled as during his 2017 visit, despite this contradicting the hostile image of the United States the Chinese government has sold its public for the past decade.
In a best-case scenario, the China visit proceeds with minimal disruptions, and both sides buy more short-term stability. It may be undergirded by a trade and investment framework that allows for regular touchpoints like purchase commitments by specific dates to maintain the truce into the future. This will not, however, meaningfully address the deep mutual mistrust built up over the last decade. Neither side will adjust their divergent geopolitical strategies, nor will Beijing or Washington remove any of the coercive tools they have built up as contingencies for when things go south.
This will leave relations on unsteady footing, prone to sudden bouts of escalation. The visit may temporarily stabilize relations. But the structural logic of strategic competition and supply-chain weaponization remains unchanged. The question is not whether another escalation will occur – but when.
Daniel Rechtschaffen is associate director for United States and Canada at Control Risks, where he advises multinationals on U.S.-Chinese relations, Indo-Pacific geopolitics, economic security, and technology policy to multinational companies. Previously, he was government relations manager at the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai. Daniel has written extensively on China, economic security, and geopolitics, and is regularly cited by others in the field. He has a master’s degree in China studies from the University of Washington and a bachelor’s degree in history from Concordia University. He is fluent in English and Chinese.
Image: Sgt. Daniela Lechuga Liggio via Wikimedia Commons
