Former Toyota CEO Koji Sato used one of his last major appearances in the role to send a message that sounded less like routine corporate caution and more like an alarm bell. Speaking to about 700 executives from 484 supplier companies at Toyota’s annual supplier gathering on March 25, Sato warned that the industry’s old habits were no longer enough and, according to reports citing his speech, said, “Unless things change, we will not survive.” Just days later, Toyota confirmed that Sato would move to vice chairman and chief industry officer on April 1, with Kenta Kon taking over as president and CEO.
That warning matters because it came from the company that has spent decades setting the global standard for manufacturing discipline. Toyota remained the world’s top-selling automaker in 2025, even as production slipped in some regions and Chinese competition intensified. When a company with Toyota’s scale and reputation starts talking openly about survival, the point is not that collapse is imminent. The point is that the competitive ground underneath the global auto business is moving much faster than many traditional carmakers expected.
It is tempting to reduce China’s rise to a price story, but that only captures part of what is happening. BYD sold 4.6 million vehicles in 2025, even though growth slowed sharply and profitability came under pressure from the domestic price war. The company still entered 2026 with a major overseas push underway, first talking about up to 1.6 million exports, then adjusting the target lower before later expressing confidence it could reach 1.5 million overseas sales. That is the scale legacy automakers are now reacting to.
The deeper issue is control over the most important parts of the EV value chain. The IEA says China accounted for about 80% of global battery cell production in 2024, giving its automakers and suppliers an enormous structural advantage. CATL remains the world’s largest EV battery maker, while BYD has become a major force not just in finished vehicles but in batteries and charging technology as well. That is why the Chinese challenge is about far more than sticker price. It is about supply chain control, speed of execution, and the ability to move new technology into production quickly.
China’s auto surge also no longer belongs only to traditional manufacturers. Huawei’s intelligent automotive solutions business grew 72.1% in 2025, while Xiaomi has already become a meaningful EV player after entering the market with the SU7. Reuters has also reported that Chinese EV chassis and software can save global automakers billions of dollars and years of development time. That is a very different competitive threat from the one Western and Japanese brands spent decades preparing for.
Not every established automaker is in the same position. Volkswagen has been trying to localize more aggressively in China while also pushing a new generation of smaller, lower-cost EVs in Europe, including projects like the Cupra Raval and Skoda Epiq. Renault, meanwhile, has leaned into the idea that affordable EVs still matter, reviving models like the Twingo and pushing its overseas expansion at the same time. Those are expensive, complicated transitions, but at least they suggest a clear strategic direction.
The situation looks more uncomfortable for several Japanese automakers. Honda has already scaled back parts of its EV plan to focus more heavily on hybrids. Nissan has moved to end production at its Wuhan plant in China as it restructures. Mitsubishi had already pulled out of vehicle production in China, and even Skoda, a European brand once heavily invested there, is now leaving the Chinese market by mid-2026. Those are not isolated footnotes. They are signs of how quickly China has become a brutally difficult place for slower-moving legacy brands.
What makes Sato’s message especially important is that it was not only about Chinese rivals. It was also about Toyota’s own cost structure and habits. Toyota has for years run what it calls “Smart Standard Activity,” a supplier-focused effort to eliminate excessive quality requirements that add cost without adding customer value. In supplier materials, the company has acknowledged that it had been forcing suppliers to scrap parts over cosmetic issues on components customers would never even see. That aligns with reports that Toyota once rejected large numbers of wire harness connectors and other hidden parts over minor appearance flaws with no functional effect.
That is the real subtext of the crisis warning. Toyota is not suddenly abandoning quality. It is admitting that standards, processes, and cost assumptions built for an earlier era can become liabilities if they are not constantly reexamined. In a market now shaped by software speed, battery economics, and relentless Chinese competition, legacy automakers can no longer afford to treat time, cost, and manufacturing complexity as secondary issues.
Europe and the United States still have powerful brands, deep dealer networks, engineering talent, and decades of consumer trust. Those strengths are real. They also are not permanent advantages. If they are not matched by competitive battery technology, faster software development, and products people can actually afford, the gap will keep widening. Toyota’s leadership transition happened on April 1, but the message Sato delivered before stepping aside was larger than one company or one succession plan. If even Toyota believes the industry has entered a survival fight, everyone else should be paying attention.
This article originally appeared on Autorepublika.com and has been republished with permission by Guessing Headlights. AI-assisted translation was used, followed by human editing and review.
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