Appointed to the Senate of Canada in November 2016, the Honourable Yuen Pau Woo sits as an independent senator representing the province of British Columbia. A longtime public policy expert on Canada-Asia relations and former President and CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Senator Woo serves on the Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs and International Trade; Banking, Trade and Commerce; and Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament. In this interview, Pitasanna Shanmugathas, JURIST’s Senior Editor for Long-Form Content, engages in a wide-ranging discussion with Senator Woo at a moment of profound uncertainty for Canada — one in which the Carney government is simultaneously cracking down on immigrants and refugees rights through Bill C-12, arming conflict zones while claiming moral authority, deferring to the United States on the Safe Third Country Agreement, spending billions on NATO without a coherent vision of Canadian sovereignty, and abstaining on a United Nations resolution calling for reparations for the transatlantic slave trade. Against this backdrop, Senator Woo offers a measured but unflinching assessment of a country that, in his view, keeps asking the right questions while reaching for all the old answers.

Pitasanna Shanmugathas: For our international readers at JURIST who might be unaware of Canada’s parliamentary structure, Canada has a bicameral system consisting of the Senate and the House of Commons. Unlike the United States, Canadian senators are not democratically elected but are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister and serve until age 75. Could you talk about the role and responsibility of a Canadian senator?

Senator Yuen Pau Woo: The Senate is the upper chamber in a bicameral Parliament and functions much like other bicameral legislatures. It deals with legislation, and any bill that becomes law must pass both the House of Commons and the Senate in exactly the same form.

We study bills, debate them, and ultimately vote on them. We have the power to vote against a bill; to make amendments and offer opposition to the bill short of an amendment or short of voting against them. We serve as, what we say in Canada, offering the “sober second thought” on all bills that come to the Canadian Parliament.

Shanmugathas:  Proponents of the Senate’s current structure argue that, although Senators are unelected, their appointment is intended to ensure equal regional representation, allowing diverse regional voices to be heard at the federal level. However, a significant number of Canadians also criticize the Senate as costly, burdensome, and lacking accountability. What would you say to those who support abolishing the Senate or favour allowing Canadians to directly elect Senators?

Senator Woo: Let me take the second part of your question first. An elected Senate, like in the United States or Australia, would create competition between the upper and lower houses, leading to confusion over where the ultimate legitimacy and authority lies. We’ve seen deadlock in systems where both chambers are elected as well as questions of legitimacy.

I would not favour an elected upper chamber. While one can legitimately question an appointed Senate, it is important to stress that the Senate of Canada, precisely because it is appointed, recognizes its role as a complementary chamber to that of the House of Commons and will seize its function as providing that of a review and a check on the House of Commons rather than a source of opposition.

It is extremely rare that the upper house would defeat a government bill or insist on amendments that have been proposed to the lower house.  This is in keeping with the appointed nature of the Senate and the fact that we have tenure that allows us to go to the age of 75. Fundamentally, our role is about providing a view on legislation that is not subject to short-term partisan considerations or more narrow parochial concerns that Members of Parliament in the House of Commons are naturally predisposed to. We like to take a longer view, more of a national perspective, and offer our advice in a way that does not overstep our status as appointed members.

Shanmugathas: You were appointed as a senator on the advice of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. In terms of both foreign and domestic policy, would you assess the record of the Trudeau government in a positive or negative light?

Senator Woo: There are both positive and negative elements. I’m not a partisan. I was appointed on the advice of Justin Trudeau, but I was appointed as an independent. In fact, I would not have accepted this appointment if I had been asked to sit as a Liberal, for example.

If you look at my record of interventions in the Senate during the Trudeau years, and indeed into the early part of the Mark Carney administration, you will see that I have spoken out against bills that I felt were ill thought out and would have negative consequences, even if I did not ultimately vote against the bill as such.

It’s important to make that distinction. Showing opposition to a government bill does not necessarily mean voting against it, precisely because senators are appointed and not elected, and we have the ability to use other aspects of the legislative role to raise objections or concerns to those very bills short of defeating a bill.

Shanmugathas: Can you give some examples of bills under the Trudeau government that you opposed?

Senator Woo: Yes, of course. I was part of a group of senators that worked very hard on the Impact Assessment Act, Bill C-69 at the time—a bill to which we proposed nearly 200 amendments. I was very involved in the design and tabling of many of those amendments.

As it turned out, the government accepted many of them, though not all. For those that were not accepted, the Senate, myself included, deferred to the decision of the House of Commons.

Another bill I not only opposed but actively sought to amend was Bill C-70, passed in 2024. This was related to national security and foreign interference. I was particularly concerned about provisions that would require individuals to register in a foreign influence transparency registry or face prosecution under an amended Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act if deemed to be “in association with” a foreign entity.

I felt very strongly that the phrase “in association with” was very vague and could be interpreted too broadly. I remain concerned that it could be used too liberally, potentially leading to the stigmatization or prosecution of individuals who are likely entirely innocent.

Shanmugathas: Senator Yuen Pau Woo, Bill C-12, the An Act respecting certain measures relating to the administration of Canada’s immigration system, has attracted significant criticism from human rights advocates and the United Nations Human Rights Committee for granting broad discretionary powers over immigrants and refugees, including a provision that bars individuals who first entered Canada more than one year ago from making refugee claims before the Immigration and Refugee Board, as well as allowing decisions based on a loosely defined “public interest.” Now that the bill has become law, could you elaborate on the nature of the debates you had with your colleagues in the Senate?

Senator Woo: That’s a very big question, as there are many aspects to the bill, a part of it has to do with the criminal code, you are referring to the immigration provisions of C-12, so I’ll focus on the immigration provisions.

The first thing to observe is that C-12 was not studied in great detail in the House of Commons. Many very credible groups—refugee organizations, asylum groups, immigration lawyers, the Bar Association, and international bodies—were not given the opportunity to testify. As a result, when the bill came to the Senate, many of these same groups saw it as their last opportunity to have their voices heard.

They were indeed heard at the Social Affairs Committee, and you can see from the committee’s report that members were largely persuaded by those who had concerns across the areas you’ve mentioned. I would go so far as to say that if there was one common message from opponents of the bill, it was that all of the immigration provisions—what we call sections 5 to 8—should be removed and not proceeded with. That recommendation was reflected in the committee’s report, which also identified a number of specific flaws requiring remedies.

As debate proceeded in the Senate, it became clear that a number of senators were sufficiently concerned to propose amendments, and I was very much part of a group that worked collaboratively to develop those amendments. We did so with the understanding that the House of Commons had already passed the bill with a substantial majority, and that for the Senate to take the more radical step of deleting entire sections would likely have been seen as overstepping our powers.

So, the approach we took was to identify precision amendments in specific areas of the bill where we believed the bill could be improved—where the problems could be ameliorated without undermining the policy intent of the government. At no point were we trying to gut the bill or thwart its objectives, which are ultimately the prerogative of the elected government. Nor did we seek to delay the bill unnecessarily or block its passage, even though parliamentary procedure would have allowed for that.

In the end, at third reading, I believe there were seven amendments proposed along these lines. Only one of them got through, along with two so-called “friendly” amendments from the government sponsor. However, in terms of the amendments that reflected the concerns raised at committee, only one succeeded—and it was subsequently rejected by the House of Commons.

The Senate has since deferred to the House. So, while there was significant debate, careful study, and a genuine effort to improve the bill, the final outcome reflects the constitutional reality that the elected chamber has the final word.

Shanmugathas: I think one of the most troubling things about Bill C-12 is this provision of “public interest” of how the government can essentially cancel immigration applications on the basis of “public interest,” and this term isn’t clearly defined. The term is very vague. What are your thoughts on that and now that this bill is law, what implications do you think it will have on immigrants and refugees in Canada? Migrant Rights Network is decrying that this law is going to turn Canada into a “deportation machine.”

Senator Woo: I certainly hope those concerns do not materialize, but the way I think about legislation is that we have to legislate for the long term. We have to recognize that the current government—one that people may or may not trust—will not be there forever, and that future governments may interpret a loosely worded provision in ways that are less benign.

There are a number of my colleagues who are willing to give the benefit of the doubt to the Carney government. We are, after all, in a moment of considerable national stress, and many of colleagues not only support the government but want to make sure there should be as few obstacles as possible in the way of the government’s agenda. So even where they acknowledge, as you pointed out, that “public interest” is ill-defined and could become a very blunt instrument, they are not inclined to see it as a pressing concern—either now or in the future. This is the attitude of many of my colleagues.

It is not just that “public interest” is vaguely defined; it is that it is not exhaustively defined. While the government has pointed to examples such as national security or public health, the wording allows for additional justifications to be introduced over time. That means the scope of these powers could expand well beyond what is currently contemplated.

Moreover, the extraordinary powers attached to this provision are not confined strictly to the categories explicitly listed in the bill. Because of the way the provision is drafted, they could be applied to other documents, other statuses, and other situations that are not clearly spelled out. That creates a level of discretion that is quite significant.

The task now, in my view, shifts to civil society, legal aid organizations, immigration advocacy groups, and civil liberties groups to be very vigilant in how the government intends to use these powers. My worry, not dissimilar to yours, is that there is a backlog problem, and although the government has not said this outright, it may be considering whether these powers can be used to reduce that backlog—by identifying certain categories of applications and effectively wiping them out, if I can put it that way, through the use of this measure.

That is why I was particularly supportive of an amendment that would have imposed a time limit on these extraordinary powers—three or five years—on the theory that even if they were needed to deal with a backlog or an exceptional situation, they should not become permanent features of the system. Once the immediate problem is addressed, the powers should lapse.

However, that amendment did not pass. The government was quite clear that it views these powers not as temporary tools, but as structural features that should remain available indefinitely—for example, in the event of cyberattacks or large-scale fraud.

So, we are now in a situation where broad, open-ended discretionary powers exist in law, and the real test will be how they are used in practice.

Shanmugathas: And, as I’m sure you’re aware, immigration experts have said that this bill will not address the backlog problem, but what it will likely do is just shift the burden elsewhere.

Senator Woo: Shift the burdens to the courts, correct.

Shanmugathas: A reason for the government’s introduction of Bill C-12 has been speculated to be in response to public frustration with rising housing costs and the pressures associated with immigration, and it is true that recent population growth—including the surge in international students into Canada under Trudeau, many of whom were disproportionately Indian—intensified demand in already strained housing markets. However, Canada’s housing crisis long predates this immigration surge and is widely linked to structural policy failures: from the federal withdrawal from public housing in the 1990s to the continued reliance—under successive governments, including Justin Trudeau’s government—on market-driven approaches like the National Housing Strategy, which critics argue prioritized incentives to private developers over large-scale public housing investment.

In that context, how do you respond to concerns that Bill C-12 risks scapegoating racialized migrant communities for a crisis produced by decades of government policy, and that by linking immigration to housing unaffordability, it diverts attention from these structural failures while justifying sweeping and restrictive immigration measures?

Senator Woo: Well, not only housing affordability, but also criminality was used as one of the justifications for this bill—particularly the very contemporary problem of extortion in British Columbia, but in other places as well. We had the Premier of British Columbia come out to say that we need C-12 to deal with the extortion problem.

So, there are a number of hot-button issues that were flagged by the government and its supporters to, I think, whip up public support for the bill.

I think it’s correct to say that the public has a general feeling that we overshot in terms of allowing temporary residents into the country—that we, as the term goes, lost control of it, and therefore had to do something about it. But you know what, we’ve dealt with that.

You can see in the Auditor General’s report that came out just a few days ago that, in terms of the flows of new entrants to Canada—particularly temporary residents—they are way, way down. In fact, they are so far down that we likely have overcompensated.

So, I like to think about this in terms of stocks and flows. The stock problem is something we will have to deal with for some time, because those individuals are already here, and it will take a while to sort through that. But the flow problem has already been fixed—and it can be fixed by fiat, if you will, because the government sets immigration caps each year for students, landed immigrants, and so on.

They’ve essentially fixed the flow problem. Now, I think they are trying to fix the stock problem with some of the measures in C-12. But as you point out, what we are likely to see is not only more bottlenecks in a different part of the system, but also—as my colleague pointed out in support of one of the amendments—the new Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) process, which does not allow for in-person interviews for people who are about to be deported, or even those applying for asylum status, that paper-based process, absent a face-to-face interview, is more likely to miss criminality and other problematic issues than a process that allows for in-person interviews.

Shanmugathas: And PRRAs, they have a high refusal rate. I think it’s over 90%, right?

Senator Woo: Correct. Now, I mean, what they will say is that the PRRA process is at the end of the process, so you would expect a higher rate. But I think the way to think about this is, even to the extent that you are concerned about making sure the right people who deserve to get asylum are given the chance to have asylum in Canada, and that you want a process that can identify problematic cases, we have a study and evidence from a former senior official at the Immigration Refugee Board, at Immigration Canada, saying that the PRRA process is more likely to make mistakes.

Shanmugathas: Do you believe Canada should withdraw from the Safe Third Country Agreement, and if so, why has Canada—under both Justin Trudeau and now Prime Minister Mark Carney—refused to do so, particularly in light of Donald Trump’s increasingly repressive treatment of asylum seekers entering the United States?

Senator Woo: I think you know the reason. In fact, we don’t even have to look at the Safe Third Country Agreement to understand the motivations for many of the things we are doing in this country related to the border and related to immigration. C-12 itself, I think, can in some way be seen as a way to signal to the Americans that we are also serious about immigration. We’re not going to let undesirables come in. We’re going to make sure that if there are undocumented individuals, individuals who are staying here without authorization, we will find ways to expedite their removal. Safe Third Country is a subset of that larger constellation of signals, I think, that we are trying to manage with the Americans. It should be patently obvious that it’s risky for certain classes of individuals, whether based on their nationality or religion or their sexual orientation or their political views. It should be patently obvious that the United States is not a safe place for many of these individuals.

Shanmugathas: In 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur described Canada’s temporary foreign worker program as “a breeding ground for contemporary forms of slavery,” a finding formalized in a 2024 report. Systemic flaws—like closed work permits and limited residency options—create dependence on employers, preventing workers from reporting abuse. With Bill C-12 expanding powers to cancel work permits and suspend immigration documents under the vague “public interest” provision, these vulnerabilities may worsen. What specific reforms do you think the government should pursue to dismantle these exploitative structures and better protect migrant workers’ rights?

Senator Woo: Well, there is a push and pull on this issue. You will be aware that some parts of the country are advocating for a higher intake of temporary foreign workers, on farms, for example, and in certain jobs where it’s just very difficult to find Canadians and permanent residents. And then there is the more generalized feeling that we’ve got too many temporary residents anyway. They are depressing wages and adding to the cost of housing, and we should continue to limit numbers. So in this push and pull, I think we may be neglecting or not reflecting some of the issues that you’ve raised, which is that even to the extent that we can land on an optimal number that pleases the bulk of Canadian interests, we need to make sure that the rights of these individuals are protected and that they are not put in situations where their ability to respond to abuse and ill treatment is hampered by the very terms of their employment. This should be particularly obvious because we are, in so many other respects, at the forefront of condemning use of forced labour and slavery, and trade actions against countries that purportedly are using forced labour.

Shanmugathas: Bill C-233 would have required Canadian military exports to the U.S. to undergo the same human rights reviews as other destinations. Given reports showing Canadian-made components ending up in Israeli attacks on Gaza, how can Canada claim moral authority while allowing an exemption that may fuel international human rights violations?

Senator Woo: Following Prime Minister Carney’s speech in Davos—where he so clearly articulated the double standards embedded in the international system, and acknowledged that the old order, while beneficial to some, was ultimately a fiction in its claim to fairness—there appeared to be a genuine commitment to abandon that pretense. His remarks suggested a willingness to “take the sign from the window,” to stop perpetuating both the illusion and the double standards that sustain it. One might have expected, then, that this would be an area in which Canada could exercise a measure of moral clarity.

Instead, the hard realities of geopolitics—and Canada’s deep dependence on the United States—have prevailed, effectively eclipsing any movement toward the more consistent, “values-based realism” Carney seemed to endorse.

Turning to the bill itself, its decisive defeat in the House is telling. But even more revealing is Minister Anand’s justification for opposing it. She argued that the bill would decimate Canada’s defence industry and damage relations with the United States. That reasoning is striking. It comes close to acknowledging that Canadian arms exports to the U.S. are, in practice, integrated into supply chains that ultimately feed into conflict zones where serious violations of international humanitarian law have occurred. In that sense, her statement edges toward an admission of complicity.

That such a position was expressed so plainly should invite deeper scrutiny—not only of the bill, but of Canada’s broader foreign policy framework, and the extent to which its application of legal and moral standards varies depending on who is cast as the protagonist and the antagonist in any given conflict.

Shanmugathas: Given Israel’s brutal assault on Gaza, its bombing of Lebanon, and its stated intention to occupy southern Lebanon—an intention that Prime Minister Carney has condemned—as well as Israel’s attacks on Syria and now its bombing of Iran, why does the Carney government refuse to impose sanctions on Israel, despite the tens of thousands of civilians who have been killed?

Senator Woo: They have a convenient alternate story that allows them to skirt the question of the U.S. and Israel’s illegal attack on Iran. That story is that the Iranian regime is not a pleasant one—that Canada has long opposed the Islamic Republic, that there is evidence of human rights abuses within Iran, and that it exports terrorism beyond its borders.

This is the standard talking point in nearly every statement that comes out of Global Affairs. It often appears in the first two or three paragraphs, and it allows many people to be distracted from the violations of international law and from the fact that the conflict was not precipitated by Iran, however objectionable the regime may be. Rather, it was precipitated in an unjustified way by the United States and Israel.

We had Global Affairs officials testify recently at the Foreign Affairs Committee, and I pointed out to them that when discussing Ukraine, we consistently use the phrase “the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine.” But when they spoke about Iran, they did not use the word “illegal.”

So, I pressed them on whether they believed the attacks—the bombing—were illegal. I received a legalistic answer from counsel at Global Affairs, which essentially amounted to: “I cannot disclose the advice I gave to the government.” To me, that says a great deal. It goes without saying that if her advice to the government had been that international law was not violated, she likely would have said so publicly. The fact that she was unwilling to share that advice makes the implication fairly clear.

There’s no need for any elaborate deduction here. It appears to be an illegal attack. While I can understand, to some extent, why the government might avoid saying so outright, it is still extremely disappointing.

Shanmugathas: I am also sure you are aware that Minister Anand recently announced additional sanctions on Iran.

Senator Woo: And that’s the thing: they always have a kind of safety valve—if I can put it that way. They can fall back on the brutality of the Iranian regime whenever the issue arises. They can point to its conduct to show they’re not being idle: if you want more sanctions, they’ll impose more sanctions; if you want condemnations, they can readily provide them. There is no shortage of reasons to criticize the Iranian regime, and they are very effective at doing so. But it functions as a deflection. I’m not defending Iran here—rather, I’m pointing out that this shifts attention away from the cause of the war, from what precipitated it, and from the war crimes taking place, including attacks on civilian infrastructure and civilians themselves.

Shanmugathas: Senator Yuen Pau Woo, Bill C‑9—the Combatting Hate Act—has just passed its final vote in the House of Commons and now moves to the Senate. Bill C-9 proposes to remove Canada’s long-standing “religious exemption” in hate speech law, which currently allows people to express opinions about religion in good faith without being criminally charged. Critics argue that, combined with vague new offences criminalizing the display of certain symbols, the bill could unintentionally suppress legitimate protest, journalism, or community advocacy—especially among marginalized groups. How should the Senate approach this legislation to ensure we effectively combat hate without undermining fundamental Charter‑protected freedoms such as religion, expression, and peaceful assembly?

Senator Woo: Well, we’re still in the early stages of Senate deliberation, and I’ve been following the bill very closely. It has already had a number of twists and turns in the House of Commons, and we are being lobbied very vigorously. If Bill C-12 is any indication, I would expect many of my colleagues to be inclined to give the government the benefit of the doubt. They are likely to be persuaded by what we are told is a national crisis of hate activity and crimes.

Don’t get me wrong—hate crimes are indeed occurring across the country. What’s curious, however, is that most faith-based groups appear to oppose this bill, with the notable exception of the Jewish community. That may or may not be significant, but you won’t be surprised to hear that I am concerned about the bill’s potential impact on legitimate protest—particularly against violations of international law and illegal occupation, such as in the West Bank—or on the recruitment of Canadians to fight in a war, especially one where war crimes are being committed. These activities are taking place in what are ostensibly “designated spaces,” which, on the face of it, this bill would prohibit.

Shanmugathas: On March 25, 2026, Canada abstained from a United Nations General Assembly resolution that condemned the transatlantic slave trade as “among the gravest violations of human rights in human history” and called for reparations. Considering Canada’s historic involvement in African enslavement—including holding Africans in bondage for over 200 years, supporting Caribbean plantation economies through Atlantic Canada’s fisheries and privateers, and benefiting economically from slavery—why did Canada choose to abstain on this resolution?

Senator Woo: I have no clear explanation. You’ll see from the list of abstentions that a number of other Western countries did the same—though not all. It could be the reparations aspect that caused concern.

Without reading too much into the government’s motivation—and I’m sure they would not in any way try to defend the transatlantic slave trade—I think there is a certain zeitgeist in Western European and white settler countries. There is a tendency to be less inclined to self-flagellate over the unsavory parts of their own history: to downplay, maybe not deny, slavery, abuses against Indigenous peoples, and the harms of colonialism and imperialism.

Canada wasn’t involved in much of that, though we were implicated in some instances. Even so, there is a kind of license—let me put it that way. Even if one does not subscribe to extreme forms of nativist or European pride, or even “Canadian pride,” there is a sense that we can acknowledge wrongdoing without dwelling on it. We are proud to be Canada, proud of our heritage, and we are not going to beat ourselves up—even while admitting the past was wrong.

I think this vote is emblematic of the move in that direction. Again, I’m not suggesting that the government would in any way try to defend the transatlantic slave trade, but there is clearly a mood among many to simply put it behind us.

Shanmugathas: It was recently announced under Mark Carney’s government Canada has officially met the NATO spending target of 2% GDP that was set in 2014. What are your thoughts on this latest development?

Senator Woo: Well, it’s long been promised, and there are different ways to look at it. There are questions around the accounting—how much of the spending actually reflects the kinds of priorities that Donald Trump or NATO cares about. There’s also the question of who we are doing it for, and to the extent it is to satisfy President Trump’s whims, that raises legitimate concerns.

Another question is whether we ever spent enough in the first place, and whether our national defence needs truly require us to reach 2% of GDP—or more. But I think these broader questions about the purpose of defence spending haven’t been properly discussed in this country. Defence spending should provide Canada with the military and other capabilities necessary to maintain sovereignty and strategic autonomy in international relations. It’s not clear to me that NATO guarantees us either strategic autonomy or true sovereignty to pursue a path that builds prosperity and positive relations worldwide.

So far, all the discussion about hitting the 2% target—and even 5%—is framed entirely as a way to remain within NATO. But what will NATO look like two or five years from now? Who will be part of it? Where will the U.S. be? It’s not implausible to imagine NATO evolving into a largely European-centric mutual defence alliance, with the U.S. playing a more peripheral role. If that happens, is the 5% target meant to support a European mutual defence alliance? And who will even be part of that alliance? Considering the changing political landscape in Europe, which many Canadians would likely find uncomfortable, is that the type of alliance we want to join?

Mr. Carney is asking the right questions, but for now, he’s offering all the old answers. He’s right to say that we need to take the sign down from the window and pursue a foreign policy based on variable geometry and coalitions of the willing, united by common purpose. But his initiatives so far—these coalitions of the willing—remain tied to old-world alliances and thinking. He has yet to substantially break out of the old world that he has so correctly identified as on its way out.

Shanmugathas: I think this latest development also lends criticism as to why we are spending so much on defense when there are more important priorities like climate change, investing in housing, investing in the crumbling infrastructure.

Senator Woo: I’m very sympathetic to the argument, but my view is that it’s not wrong for us to spend more on defence. I’m not convinced that 5% is the right target, but the key question is: what are we spending it for? Who is the threat to Canada?

It goes without saying that if spending 5% on defence simply results in buying more American military materiel, and if the clear and present threat to Canada today is the United States, then that doesn’t add up.

If we argue that the spending is meant to defend the Arctic, there is some logic to it—but then we need to be clear about what threats we actually face there. Russia, conceivably, but the United States as well. And if that is part of the problem, how should our defence spending be aligned?

These are the questions we haven’t properly answered. I worry that we will end up spending this money in a way that reflects the old order, rather than preparing for the new order that Mr. Carney rightly wants us to anticipate.

Shanmugathas: What are your takeaway thoughts on the Carney government going forward? Are you optimistic or pessimistic about its direction?

Senator Woo: As an independent senator, I don’t have formal affiliations with any party. I will support Mr. Carney on any of his policies that I believe are appropriate for the moment, consistent with my own values, and position Canada not just to address immediate problems but also to meet longer-term challenges.

I think he has a solid understanding of the problems the world faces today and the constraints Canada is under. His general approach—to strengthen our domestic capacity through infrastructure, productivity, and internal development, while externally building more partnerships—makes sense to me.

That said, I worry that the status quo will dominate even the best intentions. There is a lot of path dependency in this country: our business leaders, military, and civil society organizations are deeply enmeshed in North American and Atlantic networks, which makes it difficult to chart different paths. We need to work more closely with countries in the Global South.

In a nutshell, that is my offering to the government. I’m not sure we yet have the skills, knowledge, or even the inclination to do this, because it is risky and requires the imagination to build coalitions beyond traditional European and North American partners.

Finally, I want to say that I wish Mr. Carney well. A failure of his government would be detrimental for all of us, and the political consequences of such a failure could be very harmful to the country.

Shanmugathas: Thank you so much, Senator, for speaking with JURIST. I really appreciate you taking the time from your busy schedule.