In cybersecurity or corruption, the bad guys always win the first round, says the author. [AP]
Europe’s recent move to sideline Chinese telecom giants marks a turning point – not only for the continent’s digital future, but for Greece’s strategic identity. After years of hesitation, the European Commission is preparing to require member-states to remove Huawei and ZTE equipment from their mobile networks. What long existed as a recommendation is becoming a mandate. The neutral language of “high-risk vendors” masks something far more consequential: the recognition that technology is now a domain of geopolitical power.
For Brussels, this shift is about sovereignty, about ensuring that Europe’s digital backbone cannot be shaped or leveraged by others. For Beijing, it signals that the age of unguarded European openness is ending. But for Greece, the implications are uniquely complex. Athens stands at the intersection of Europe’s strategic awakening and China’s long-standing presence in the Mediterranean. How it handles the Huawei question will reveal whether the country can navigate a world where networks and chips are as decisive as pipelines and shipping lanes once were. If Greece simply complies with Brussels, it may bear the cost of transition without gaining strategic benefit. If it acts with foresight, it can turn this shift into an opportunity to modernize, strengthen competitiveness, and redefine its role within Europe.
For two decades, Europe believed that economics and geopolitics could remain separate. Chinese firms were welcomed as efficient partners, and Huawei quietly built large parts of Europe’s 4G networks. That era of cost-driven complacency has ended. The Commission’s tightening approach reflects a realization that supply chains shape national security and that digital infrastructure is now an arena of strategic influence. Yet Europe’s response is uneven. Several states fear the financial and diplomatic fallout of replacing Huawei equipment. Others worry that a hurried transition will slow innovation rather than accelerate it. The question is whether the EU can convert a defensive instinct into technological renewal – and whether Greece can use this transition to its advantage.
Greece illustrates China’s rise in Europe more vividly than most. During the years of its financial crisis, Chinese capital flowed into sectors others avoided. COSCO transformed the port of Piraeus into a major Mediterranean gateway. Huawei supplied affordable telecom equipment and partnered with Greek universities, embedding itself in the country’s research ecosystem. These moves once seemed purely economic; today they expose strategic vulnerabilities that touch connectivity, logistics, and even political leverage. Meanwhile, Greece has not yet articulated a comprehensive national vision for digital sovereignty. The absence of such a framework leaves the country responding case-by-case to external pressures rather than shaping its own long-term path.
The potential consequences of drift are serious. Replacing Huawei equipment could cost Greek operators hundreds of millions, slowing 5G deployment and delaying the country’s digital modernization. That, in turn, risks dampening competitiveness in sectors such as tourism, logistics and manufacturing that increasingly depend on advanced connectivity. Diplomatically, Athens must balance alignment with Brussels against the risk of straining economic ties with Beijing. Yet the greater danger is industrial: If Greece simply swaps one foreign vendor for another, it will remain dependent and peripheral, missing the chance to build domestic capacity and secure its position in Europe’s emerging technological hierarchy.
Paradoxically, the current moment offers Greece a rare opening. For the first time in years, EU priorities – secure infrastructure, technological resilience, and modern connectivity – align with Greece’s own needs. Brussels is prepared to fund these transitions through Horizon Europe, STEP, and the Recovery Fund. To seize this opportunity, Greece needs a clear national strategy for digital sovereignty, anchored in the Prime Minister’s Office, that links telecom security with industrial policy, research, and education. Such a strategy should include a predictable, phased transition away from high-risk vendors, giving operators clarity and investors confidence. Crucially, it must also define what strategic autonomy means for a midsized European economy that cannot – and need not – replicate the technological giants of the north.
Greece has an opportunity to present itself not just as a compliant member-state but as a contributor to Europe’s collective digital resilience.
Sovereignty requires capability. Greece should focus on strategic niches such as cybersecurity, interoperability, and trusted digital infrastructure. It could position itself as a testbed for open radio access networks (O-RAN), attracting European and American partners seeking real-world environments for next-generation connectivity. Such positioning would not only diversify Greece’s supplier base but deepen its integration into Europe’s technological ecosystem. Financing is equally important. A modest “Trusted Tech” fund could support Greek startups in cybersecurity, cloud services, and connectivity software, helping seed a new generation of domestic firms. Meanwhile, the presence of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) in Athens gives Greece a natural advantage in developing a skilled cybersecurity workforce – a critical asset for any country seeking technological autonomy.
Recalibrating the relationship with China will also be essential. Greece should neither reject China nor depend on it. Chinese investment can remain welcome in non-sensitive sectors such as shipping, tourism, and renewable energy, but participation in digital or defense-related industries must be screened in line with EU standards. A formal Sino-Hellenic Investment Dialogue could make this balance explicit, signaling predictability to both Brussels and Beijing and reducing the risk of misinterpretation at a delicate geopolitical moment.
The challenge, as so often in Greece, lies in implementation. Each part of a national digital strategy must be tied to measurable milestones and connected to the Recovery and Resilience Plan. Coordination should sit at the highest level of government. ENISA’s base in Athens could serve as the hub of a regional cybersecurity ecosystem, extending Greek influence across the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean. Greece has an opportunity to present itself not just as a compliant member-state but as a contributor to Europe’s collective digital resilience.
If Greece takes the initiative, it can anchor the region within Europe’s secure digital architecture and become an example of how smaller states navigate great-power competition with balance and purpose. Europe often treats competitiveness and sovereignty as opposing goals, but they are inseparable. The Huawei decision is not only a security measure; it is an industrial opportunity. If Athens approaches this moment with ambition, it can shape not only its own digital future but Europe’s as well.
Greece has spent a decade rebuilding its credibility. The question now is whether it will extend that credibility into the technological domain. Its response to the Huawei dilemma will determine not just which equipment sits on Greek cell towers, but what role the country will play in Europe’s emerging digital order – a rule-taker on the periphery or a strategist with a defined national purpose.
Dr Konstantinos Komaitis is a resident senior fellow and is leading the Atlantic Council’s global digital governance and democracy work. He has over 20 years of experience in the intersection of technology, policy and geopolitics.
