The new intelligence assessment came as welcome relief to some who are concerned about the most dangerous flashpoint in relations between China and America, which has long pledged to help Taiwan defend itself. To others, however, the intelligence community’s reluctance to extend its latest prediction beyond 2027 was disconcerting. Its report also failed to confront a question on many minds: does the Iran war increase the risk that Mr Xi takes military action against the island that he yearns to unify with China?

Despite concerns that an over-politicised American intelligence community might have an incentive to downplay the threat, former officials and experts who monitor the People’s Liberation Army (pla) concur that an attack on Taiwan in or before 2027 is unlikely. There are, however, growing fears that the war in the Middle East—and its consequences for American politics and military power—might make Mr Xi more likely to strike Taiwan later this decade or early next.

America has already transferred military assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East and may move more. The knock-on effects on maintenance and readiness could last for years. America and its allies have also used up many weapons needed to defend Taiwan. If the war drags on, America would face challenges on multiple fronts, said Li Yihu, an expert on Taiwan at Peking University, at a meeting of China’s parliament in March. “If America’s military presence in the Asia-Pacific is weakened, you can imagine the consequences. Who will benefit?”

The idea that Mr Xi had set a deadline of 2027 was widely repeated in government circles after Admiral Philip Davidson, as head of America’s Indo-Pacific Command, first mentioned it in a Senate hearing in 2021. But close pla-watchers see the “Davidson window”, as it became known, more as an attempt by Mr Xi to inject urgency into his efforts to modernise the armed forces ahead of their centenary in 2027. The period of greater concern now is the one between 2028, when America and Taiwan hold their next presidential elections, and the expected end of Mr Xi’s fourth term in 2032. He will be 79 by then, and perhaps impatient for progress on Taiwan.

Ely Ratner, the Pentagon’s top Asia official in the Biden administration, does not think the war in Iran greatly increases the likelihood of Mr Xi making a move on Taiwan in the near term, but “it’s more possible today than it was two months ago”. If Mr Xi’s decision ultimately depends on whether he can achieve a quick victory at acceptable cost then “a less ready, distracted and spread-thin us military makes that date come sooner than it would have otherwise”, he says. “The risk in the medium term is going up substantially.”

Mr Xi could still profit from patience. The pla has greatly enhanced its capacity to invade Taiwan, and has practised doing so with increasing frequency (see map). It has also tested the island’s air defences almost daily with military flights across the Taiwan Strait’s median line. But although it could probably conduct a blockade or quarantine, it cannot yet conduct an amphibious invasion at a sufficiently low cost and with enough speed to make it worth the risk. The longer it takes, the more time America has to intervene. Even overstretched American forces could still inflict huge losses, drawing on their recent experience using the latest technology, including ai, in battle. And the global economic fallout, which would hit China hard, would dwarf that from the Iran war.

Out of commission

Then consider the state of China’s military high command. Mr Xi has purged five of the six generals he appointed in 2022 to the Central Military Commission (cmc), which controls the pla. The cmc now consists of just Mr Xi and a single general responsible for corruption investigations. Although many of the top brass were accused of corruption, Mr Xi also seems to have grown frustrated with the slow pace of his military reforms. Younger, tech-savvy replacements might perform better, but they must be carefully screened for links to their disgraced predecessors.

By 2028, however, his new military leadership should be in place, and Taiwan’s presidential poll that year could trigger a more aggressive approach. China refuses to deal with Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (dpp), in power since 2016, and denounces the current president, Lai Ching-te, as a separatist. The main opposition party, the Kuomintang (kmt), seeks closer ties with the mainland and has been blocking an increase in defence spending. A kmt victory in 2028 might allow enough rapprochement to satisfy Mr Xi. But another dpp win could increase the risk that he prioritises military options.

America’s political calendar is a potential catalyst, too. Chinese officials have lobbied for Mr Trump to dilute America’s security commitments to Taiwan as part of a broader deal on trade and security. That gives China an incentive to hold fire, as does Mr Trump’s recent appetite for war. But Mr Xi’s calculus could change if he fails to make progress in talks with Mr Trump in the next year or two. And as America’s election approaches, he may conclude it makes more sense to strike Taiwan before Mr Trump is replaced by someone more committed to the island.

As Mr Xi makes these judgments, much will depend on how long the Iran war continues and whether America begins new escapades in Cuba, Greenland or elsewhere. China will also be watching the burn rate of ammunition, especially missile interceptors, by America, and how that affects weapons deliveries to Taiwan.

China’s conclusions could alter what its military thinkers call a “strategic window of opportunity” to take Taiwan. Many of them think that window falls within the next few years, before America’s efforts to restructure its own forces in Asia and boost Taiwan’s defences take effect. Taiwan has been slow to modernise its forces, but has made progress recently. It plans to boost defence spending from 3% of gdp to 5% by 2030 and to build a new missile-defence system by 2033. Without such plans “the likelihood of an attack would rise”, said Wellington Koo, Taiwan’s defence minister, on March 20th.

If the war in the Middle East ends soon and neutralises the Iranian threat to America and its allies, then the impact on Taiwan could be limited. American forces could refocus on Asia and there would be less need to replenish Middle Eastern arsenals. Some American officials also argue that they will be in a stronger position to take on China, having dealt with Venezuela and Iran, and even more so if the war in Ukraine ends. Conversely, that could provide China with an incentive to move against Taiwan sooner rather than later, while American forces and weapons stocks have yet to recover fully.

A longer Iran war (or an unstable peace) would give Mr Xi breathing space. That could let the pla complete its reforms, perfect the art of amphibious assault and absorb the lessons from Ukraine, Venezuela and Iran. Once Mr Xi feels he has the capability, he may show less restraint, says Charles Wu of Taiwan’s National Chengchi University. But Iran’s grip on the Strait of Hormuz might also influence his choice of action, making a blockade more likely than an invasion. Though Mr Wu does not expect China to strike imminently, he foresees more frequent Chinese aerial and naval incursions as well as bolder combined exercises around the island “to see how America responds”. That still makes this a dangerous moment for Taiwan, even if the prediction by American spies is correct.

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