Protesters hold South Korean flags and a placard with anti-China slogans during a rally in front of the Chinese Embassy in Jung District, central Seoul, in March. [YONHAP]

 
[EXPLAINER]
 
Nearly every weekend in Seoul, protesters gather holding placards that read “China Out!” and “Reject Chinese Communist Party.”
 
Clips of the rallies — including a widely circulated video in which demonstrators shout slurs directed at Chinese people — have spread across platforms such as YouTube and Weibo, generating unease in South Korea and criticism in China. Earlier this month, the footage prompted Chinese Ambassador Dai Bing to call on Seoul to “find a fundamental solution” to the ongoing demonstrations.
 
The protests have also drawn attention from South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, who this month urged “stern punishment” for acts that “promote racism and discrimination.”
 
Yet the rallies continue, sustained by a loyal base of supporters of former President Yoon Suk Yeol, who was forced out of office in April over his short-lived imposition of martial law last year. Many in the group believe — despite a lack of evidence — that China interfered in South Korean politics and played a role in Yoon’s downfall.
 
While the theory remains fringe in domestic politics, the resentment fueling it does not.
 
For much of the past three decades, South Koreans mainly viewed China as a crucial economic partner, despite differences in their political systems and geopolitical alignments. But today, many South Koreans express misgivings about the neighboring country. Public opinion surveys repeatedly show China ranking below Japan — long the main antagonist in Korean history — in terms of favorability.
 
Experts interviewed by the Korea JoongAng Daily say the shift reflects not a single rupture, but rather a culmination of years of accumulated distrust and rising suspicion abroad regarding Beijing’s rise as a global power. Taken together, they describe a sea change in views toward China driven by generational experience, declining exchanges and the use of foreign policy grievances by Korean politicians as a tool of domestic mobilization.
 
 
Why are young people at the center of Sinophobia in South Korea?
 
Young South Koreans — those in their twenties and thirties — are now the core of negative sentiment toward China, according to a survey released in June by the Seoul-based East Asia Institute (EAI).
 

“The numbers are clear,” said EAI Director Sohn Yul. “More than 70 percent of people in their twenties and thirties hold unfavorable views of China. That’s roughly 10 percentage points higher than older generations.”
 
Sohn noted that although the divide is measurable, it is narrower than in some Western democracies because unfavorable sentiment toward China was already widespread across age groups in South Korea. “The baseline is already very negative,” he said.
 
Unlike older Koreans, younger cohorts did not form their views around China’s role in the 1950-53 Korean War or its longstanding support for North Korea. Instead, Sohn said, their opinions emerged from online cultural interactions, identity politics and exposure to Chinese tourists or digital content.
 
“For the younger generation, the source of anti-China sentiment appears to be their rejection of what they perceive as the so-called national character of Chinese people, rather than Beijing’s policies,” he explained. “It’s about how they view Chinese people — not just the Chinese government.”
 
Another factor is the absence of nostalgia for past economic cooperation.
 
“This generation did not experience the period when Korean firms expanded into China or benefited substantially from trade,” Sohn said. “To them, China has never represented opportunity.”
 
That shift accelerated during the Covid-19 pandemic, said Kim Jin-ho, a professor of politics and diplomacy at Dankook University.
 

A woman throws coffee at anti-China protesters in central Seoul in a video recorded earlier this month that later circulated widely on social media. [SCREEN CAPTURE]

 
Viral social media posts depicting Chinese tourists misbehaving at local tourist sites, sensational headlines and online disputes over cultural heritage issues — such as the origins of kimchi — reinforced negative impressions.
 
“This kind of content played a major role,” Kim said. “It shaped the perception that Chinese visitors or online communities do not respect Korean rules or cultural norms.”
 
 
What are the origins of anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea?
 
If younger Koreans see China primarily through a cultural lens, older generations tend to view China through security and ideological concerns.
 
“For older people, especially conservatives, the one-party system of the Chinese Communist Party remains central to how they understand China,” Sohn said.
 

Key events in Korea—China relations also figure prominently in the memories of people in their 40s and older, according to Sohn.
 
China’s refusal to condemn North Korea after the sinking of the South Korean corvette ROKS Cheonan in 2010 hardened perceptions that Beijing prioritizes shielding Pyongyang. Territorial and historical disputes — particularly Chinese academic claims over the ancient Goguryeo kingdom (37 B.C. to A.D. 668) — provoked indignation in the early 2000s.
 
However, the event most frequently cited by respondents and experts is China’s decision to retaliate economically against South Korea for approving the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) system on its soil in 2016.
 
“When China imposed unofficial sanctions, it left a deep scar,” Kim said.
 
During the standoff over the Thaad deployment, Korean automobiles, electronics and retail chains in China were hit with arbitrary inspections and closures, while Beijing directed Chinese tour companies to stop organizing group trips to Korea. Sohn said the economic fallout of that period reshaped how Koreans viewed relations with China.
 
“Beijing’s reaction to the Thaad deployment transformed China into a coercive actor in the eyes of Koreans,” Sohn said.
 
Crucially, Kim added, such events also helped shape the perceptions of people who were not yet adults at the time.
 
“Young people may not remember when relations were good, but they certainly remember the negative developments that took place when they were in middle school and high school.”
 
 
How did South Korea start to decouple from China?
 
For years, deepening trade ties masked political tensions. After Seoul established diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1992, China gradually overtook the United States as South Korea’s largest export market and leading destination for investment. Before the pandemic, nearly 10 million people traveled between the two countries annually.
 

Conservative protesters wave South Korean and U.S. flags and hold placards denouncing China in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang, ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit on Oct. 29. [KIM SEONG-RYONG]

 
But those exchanges are much diminished today by comparison.
 
“As mutual economic dependency weakens and both countries pursue industrial competitiveness in similar sectors, emotional and political distance has widened,” Kim said.
 
Competition is particularly sharp in semiconductors, electric vehicles and AI — areas central to future industrial policy.
 
The shift has altered public sentiment in South Korea.
 
“In the past, negative views of Japan were stronger,” Kim said. “Now, Japan is perceived as stable and predictable, whereas China is seen as assertive and increasingly difficult to engage.”
 
Lee Dong-ryul, a professor of Chinese foreign relations at Dongduk Women’s University, noted that diminished human-to-human exchange further reinforces misunderstanding.
 
“When travel and communication decrease, stereotypes and misperceptions grow,” he said.
 
 
Where did suspicions about China’s role in South Korean politics originate?
 
Experts say the rise in anti-China sentiment in South Korea mirrors developments in the United States, Europe, Australia and Japan, where concerns about Beijing’s global influence have intensified.
 
Sohn calls this the globalization of wedge politics.
 
“Anti-China sentiment has become a wedge issue — a tool for mobilizing political bases,” he said.
 
Kim noted that some narratives about Chinese interference in domestic politics that circulate in Korea, especially among online communities, actually originate abroad.
 

Members of an immigrant advocacy group hold signs urging the National Human Rights Commission of Korea to intervene in anti-China protests before submitting a petition at the commission’s headquarters on Oct. 23. [YONHAP]

 
“Many of the conspiracy theories do not start here,” he said. “They are imported through YouTube and online communities, and they find an audience here through receptive interlocutors.”
 
Noting that Beijing’s soft cultural and economic ventures — such as Confucius Institutes and the Belt and Road Initiative — first became targets of suspicion in Western societies, Kim said documentaries, YouTube content and podcasts on such topics have helped mold anti-Chinese opinion in Korea.
 
Consequently, videos suggesting Chinese infiltration of Korean political parties and election systems now appear with increasing frequency in online debates in Korea, particularly among supporters of former President Yoon.
 
Kim warned that politicians who try to leverage Sinophobia for votes “risk pouring gasoline” on existing negative sentiment and “emotionally escalating tensions” in Seoul and Beijing’s already fraught relationship.
 
 
How does Sinophobia complicate Seoul’s foreign policy?
 
For Lee, the most alarming phenomenon is the evolution of anti-China sentiment from a feeling to a measure of political self-definition.
 
“When anti-China sentiment becomes a way to signal patriotism or ideological alignment,” he said, “it becomes harder to displace.”
 
Kim described the shift as moving “from disagreement with China’s actions to a categorical dislike of China.”
 
Sohn warned that “these emotions interfere with political decision-making and make rational decision-making more difficult” for policymakers, citing similar issues in Korea’s past relations with Japan.
 
“But it’s important to remember that China is far more important to South Korea’s economy and security environment than Japan,” Sohn said. “That makes leveraging anti-Chinese sentiment more consequential.”
 
 
What are the major hurdles to improving relations?
 
All three scholars expressed skepticism about short-term improvement.
 
Sohn said both of Korea’s main political camps are constrained by public sentiment.
 
“Conservatives frame themselves as anti-China and label their opponents as pro-China,” he said. “But the ruling Democratic Party also avoids discussion because public anti-Chinese sentiment is too widespread.”
 
Meanwhile, Korea’s deepening alignment with the United States and Japan — and China’s growing cooperation with North Korea — reinforce mutual suspicion.
 
According to Kim, the Yoon administration’s emphasis on trilateral cooperation between Seoul, Washington and Tokyo “played a role in cementing popular perceptions of Beijing as a strategic competitor and potential threat.”
 

Chinese Ambassador to Korea Dai Bing, left, speaks at the National Assembly in Yeouido, western Seoul, while seated next to People Power Party lawmaker Jang Dong-hyeok on Nov. 21. [KIM SEONG-RYONG]

 
He also agreed that the rise of anti-Chinese sentiment complicates the Lee administration’s efforts to improve relations with Beijing.
 
“Korea currently needs economic stability, political calm and positive relations with neighboring countries. But as anti-China sentiment becomes entangled with domestic politics and election strategies, it becomes very difficult for Seoul to adjust foreign policy without facing domestic backlash.”
 
Lee warned that “once anti-China sentiment becomes structural, reversing it becomes significantly more difficult.”
 
Still, he argued that leaders on both sides have a responsibility to prevent further deterioration.
 
“Managing the relationship will require restraint and diplomatic patience,” Lee said. “But politicians need to find a way to lower tensions and prioritize long-term stability.”
 

BY MICHAEL LEE [[email protected]]