China and Iran have gradually deepened research ties in dual-use and emerging technologies over the past 15 years, the latest update to ASPI’s China Defence Universities Tracker (CDUT) shows. The scale of this collaboration is limited, but the direct involvement of Iranian government agencies in facilitating joint research with China indicates the strategic nature of these partnerships.

US and Israeli strikes against Iran that began on 28 February have sparked global interest in how Chinese defence technology may be supporting Iran’s war effort. Media reports have shown how Iran has benefited from technologies supplied by Chinese companies, including sensitive satellite imagery revealing details of US military bases.

To shed light on how Iran may be seeking out Chinese technology and expertise to develop dual-use capabilities, ASPI has added new information on dozens of institutions in the CDUT. Our new findings document joint research programs and publications between Chinese and Iranian institutions over the past 15 years relevant to dual-use applications. These additions can give CDUT subscribers more confidence in assessing the relative risks associated with different institutions across China’s research ecosystem.

Some of the most notable collaborations are agreements signed directly between Iranian government agencies and top Chinese research institutions. In 2016, for example, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, China’s flagship scientific research organisation, signed an agreement with Iran’s Office of the Vice President for Science and Technology to pursue collaboration in nanotechnology, renewable energy, cognitive science, biotechnology and, in a 2025 update, AI. In 2017, the Iranian Space Agency established a contractual partnership focused on microsatellite development with Beihang University, one of China’s top defence universities.

University-to-university collaborations were also facilitated through bilateral government engagement. In 2013, a delegation of top Iranian ministers of science and technology met with their Chinese counterparts and announced that top Iranian universities would send 50 doctoral students to Tsinghua University, one of China’s most elite universities, to pursue training in nanotechnology, aerospace and the cognitive sciences. Tsinghua has continued to deepen its engagement with Iranian universities since then. In 2025, a delegation from Sharif University of Technology in Tehran visited Tsinghua University’s Institute for AI International Governance.

Nanotechnology and aerospace have well-documented dual-use applications, while AI offers potential gains across surveillance, autonomous systems and missile guidance. But whether these collaborations have yielded militarily significant outputs remains difficult to assess from open sources – and that is precisely where the CDUT’s detailed institution-level data becomes valuable. Rather than relying on headline-level conclusions, users of the CDUT can interrogate each institution’s research record, defence affiliations and known Iranian partnerships directly, making it a practical tool for those who need to act on the detail.

Still, the overall volume of China-Iran joint research appears low. For many Chinese institutions in the tracker, we found little to no evidence of significant joint dual-use research with Iranian institutions. For others, the only joint work in critical or dual-use technology was a single publication.

This stands in sharp contrast to China’s extensive and swiftly growing research ties with Russia. ASPI’s 2025 CDUT update showed that China-Russia joint research programs had grown dramatically since 2019. Most Chinese universities included in that update had at least some connection to Russian research institutions, and many Chinese universities had formal joint partnerships with multiple Russian counterparts.

The low volume of China-Iran joint research could reflect lack of capacity on the Iranian side or a cautious approach from the Chinese side – enough engagement to build relationships and signal solidarity with Iran, but not so much as to trigger exposure that would constrain Chinese interests in other domains.

This pattern may also reflect how China views the bilateral relationship more broadly: less a partnership of peers than a senior-junior arrangement in which Beijing decides what to provide and on what terms. Iran, under sustained economic and technological pressure, has limited leverage to demand more, so it appears to take what it can get.

For foreign institutions engaged with Chinese universities, this suggests the risk that such engagement could increase their exposure to Iran is, at least for now, low – though this varies by Chinese institution. The CDUT will continue to monitor these links, as visible through open-source data-gathering.

The latest CDUT also features a complete refresh to sanctions information across all 180-plus institutions in the tracker, including a comprehensive sweep across nine sanctions and restriction lists issued by the United States, Canada, Japan, Belgium, the European Union and Taiwan. Comprehensive updates have been extended to 12 additional institutions, covering the latest developments in their defence ties and research strengths. The tracker has also seen a range of navigational improvements designed to surface risk‑relevant information and support deeper use by our subscribers.

The CDUT now covers more than 180 Chinese civilian and military research institutions. It has become a go-to international resource, drawing substantial traffic from the US, Japan, Hong Kong, Australia, Canada, Britain, Germany, Singapore, France, Taiwan, the Netherlands and India.

The CDUT illuminates military and security links between Chinese institutions and the state, helping universities, governments and companies make informed and targeted decisions about research partnerships and collaboration. It supports export control compliance, research security assessments and international academic partnerships, due-diligence work, investment screening and informed public debate. Its goal remains to protect research integrity while preserving the benefits of international collaboration.

Find out more about ASPI’s China Defence Universities Tracker or get access here.