Whether it’s because of poor work performance, misconduct, or plain bad luck, getting fired is a near-universal experience. Even officials at the highest levels of the world’s governments and militaries are vulnerable to being axed. But when those at the height of power are dismissed, the consequences echo far beyond a single career and can alter governments and nations as a whole. 

Irregular personnel changes at higher levels of the military have never boded well for its operational capacity. In certain high-profile cases, for instance, those of Joseph Stalin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, military purges were presented as anti-corruption or modernization and ultimately led to a lack of political security. Yet Xi Jinping has seemingly not learned from the lessons of these state leaders, revealing the overpowering desire of the personalist leader to circumvent the possibility of military coups.

Stalin’s Great Terror of 1937-38 was not just a campaign of heedless repression, but a calculated effort to remove potential rivals within the Soviet Union and consolidate personal power. According to analysis by public economists Alexei Zakharow and Konstantin Sonin, the purge was a preventative measure aiming to neutralize potential challengers before they could gain significant influence. Through analysis of a comprehensive dataset of Soviet generals, Zarkharow and Sonin found that, conditional on rank and other characteristics, younger officers with strong career trajectories and noted ambitions were much more likely to be targeted by the purge. Stalin removed them from the political and military scene by arresting thousands, imprisoning them in Gulags, and executing them following closed-door trials and forced confessions. This purge would prove to be disastrous in the face of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, when the Red Army’s poor response could be attributed to the removal of the competent and talented military officers during the Great Terror. The authoritarian consolidation exhibited in Stalin’s purge was absolutely textbook.

In autocracies of the past, the military had often grown past its already massive role in securing institutional rule by controlling the main internal security services, intelligence systems, and economic levers of the nation. Many political leaders who have tried to reduce the military’s autonomy and political power have met unfortunate ends, with civilian political leaders in countries like Algeria, Burma, Egypt, Pakistan, and Thailand being met with coups and renewed impositions of strict military supremacy. Thus, the military in non-democratic or pseudo-democratic governments is a double-edged sword: it can be a crucial tool for leadership to secure power, but it can also quickly come to consolidate said power autonomously. 

Though separated by ideology and context, modern democratic governments are not invulnerable to the negative aftereffects of military purges. In 2023, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed the heads of all of Ukraine’s regional recruitment offices and launched a total overhaul of the Defense Ministry, removing Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov and all six deputy defense ministers. This was a targeted military purge aimed at reducing the unethical acquisition of equipment, bribery, and draft dodging. With the removal of leadership in these key operational sectors, there was a slowdown in the contracting of essential supplies, due to the fact that the defense ministry did not just sign individual supply contracts, but coordinated entire bureaucratic networks that authorized procurement and logistical flow. Their sudden dismissal delayed approvals, weakened coordination, and introduced instability. This instability would prove to be destructive to Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive later that year, which, as it unfolded, faced shortages in ammunition and delays in equipment deliveries, and involved inexperienced personnel confronting Russian defenses. 

In the present moment, the most significant recent military purge has been the removal of crucial military figures in the upper ranks of the People’s Liberation Army(PLA). In January, Xi Jinping removed his oldest tenured general in the PLA, Zhang Youxia, a long-time ally whose ties to Xi date back to their fathers’ shared revolutionary history. He is widely considered Xi’s closest ally in the PLA’s high command, having been a key supporter of Xi during the 20th Party Congress, where Xi broke precedent by securing a third term. With this dismissal marking the latest round of the military purges Xi initiated almost three years ago, drawing on historical lessons from destabilizing purges suggests that purges threaten institutional competence and have long-term consequences for the military’s operational capacity. If purges have repeatedly undermined military effectiveness, the question remains: Why would Xi initiate at a time of geopolitical tension?

Xi has long been engaged in anti-corruption drives disguised as political tactics to remove potential opposition. In his anti-corruption campaigns of 2012, Xi pledged to crack down on both high-ranking officials and grassroots civil servants; this effort culminated in the removal of 1.34 million officials across all levels and departments. Now, with Xi’s focus set specifically on the military, there has already been a significant overhaul. Of the 30 generals and admirals in office at the start of 2023 who ran specialized departments and theater commands, all but seven have been expelled, disappeared, or placed under investigation. In a virtual address this week, Xi characterized the past year as “unusual and extraordinary,” adding that the army had “undergone revolutionary tempering in the fight against corruption.” By describing this period as a time of “tempering,” Xi frames this process as a type of purification, solidifying the idea that loyalty is the underlying motivation behind his actions.

Much of the force is currently occupied with daily patrols, active surveillance, shows of force, and geopolitical coercion, particularly in relation to Taiwan and the South China Sea. In fact, recently, it took the PLA 19 days to launch a large-scale military exercise in response to “problematic behavior” from Taiwan, a significant increase from the average three days that it has taken to respond to events in the past. Xi’s military crackdown has concentrated on the Central Military Commission, the PLA’s supreme command authority, which makes key military decisions and oversees these daily military operations. By hollowing out the chain of command and hurting morale, Xi has clearly impeded the ability of the military in its day-to-day operations. 

This crackdown comes at an inopportune time for Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea, with recent political headwinds in Taiwan turning in China’s favor and a potential decline in American regional influence. Just last year, Taiwanese voters rejected a bid to remove lawmakers from the opposition Nationalist Party in an effort to shift the balance of power in favor of leadership that supported the island’s sovereignty. The Nationalists have long been at the forefront of pro-Chinese policy in Taiwan, blocking key legislation like the defense budget and the Anti-infiltration Act. A swing of this scale in favor of the nationalist party bodes well for Chinese influence in Taiwan, especially ahead of the 2028 general election. Moreover, President Donald Trump’s recent shift in policy towards Taiwan weakens American influence and serves to benefit China. Trump recently adopted a more transactional approach that has built on traditional strategic ambiguity, with reciprocal tariff systems and notable public silences. With Chinese presence strengthening in Taiwan and the island’s primary benefactor taking its foot off the gas, China appears well-positioned to make important headway in a relationship long defined by a historical stalemate. 

However, with modern purges historically sacrificing operational excellence for political and ideological consolidation under partisan leadership, it begs the question: Why does Xi feel like consolidating political power domestically now matters more than maintaining military capabilities at a time when those capabilities may prove to be central to China’s strategic advantage? 

In the context of Xi’s military purge, he seems to be attempting to circumvent this unfortunate trend by simultaneously weakening military leadership and consolidating their influence under his personal control by appointing highly loyal officials in their place. With the military’s full power under his control, Xi will have the opportunity to make bolder and bolder decisions that would have been impossible with a more politically heterogeneous leadership structure. The intersection of Xi’s growing political and military influence, the weakening position of the United States in relation to Taiwan relations, and pro-Chinese sentiment gaining traction in Taiwanese political spheres all point to one thing: the readiness of Xi Jinping to make unilateral decisions regarding the future of Taiwan. Xi’s military intervention allows him to make a calculated gamble to gather the resources and influence necessary to make aggressive moves in the South China Sea. In fact, Zhang Youxia was reportedly resisting accelerating China’s military readiness timeline to prepare for a potential invasion of Taiwan by 2027. His quick removal after the fact suggests that Xi’s purge is not just a consolidation of loyalty, but also strategic: removing resistance within the PLA to ensure compliance with a more aggressive military timeline. As China moves beyond the well-charted waters of a stalemate toward control, the country risks drawing powers like the United States and its allies into conflict over Taiwan’s defense—a disastrous outcome for global peace.