Republicans should not panic, insists the White House. “NO PANICANS!”, it tweeted on March 14th. Nonetheless, signs of panic can be detected.
Although President Donald Trump says he has “destroyed 100% of Iran’s Military Capability”, the 0% that remains is playing havoc with the global economy by choking off 10-15% of its oil supply. Mr Trump’s war of choice is more unpopular with American voters than any recent conflict, and the odds of a thumping for Republicans at the midterms in November just grew shorter. “It’s a wild mess,” says Curt Mills of the American Conservative.
Vexed by negative coverage, Mr Trump is describing critical media outlets as “Corrupt and Highly Unpatriotic”. On March 15th he said he was “thrilled” to hear that his Federal Communications Commission might review the broadcast licences of those that peddle “FAKE NEWS”.
Yet one source of gloomy news cannot plausibly be muzzled: the signs outside petrol stations. Every day motorists see big, bright reminders that fuel costs more than it did. And the pain is worse in states that backed Mr Trump in 2024. Because petrol taxes tend to be lower under Republicans, an increase in the oil price leads to a steeper hike in prices at the pump in red states than in blue ones.
History suggests that when fuel prices rise, voters are more likely to vote against the incumbent president. Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush all lost office after oil-price spikes.
Mr Trump won office vowing to avoid wars and bring prices down “on day one”. Breaking both promises is costing him support. Approval of the war is negligible among Democrats, low among independents and high among Republicans—but the number of Republicans who strongly approve has fallen quickly (see chart 1). Young people and Latinos, two groups that swung hard in Mr Trump’s favour in 2024, spend a higher share of their income on petrol than other Americans (see chart 2).
At Skip’s Lounge, a billiards bar in Buxton, Maine, three things are banned: politics, religion and arm-wrestling. But patrons are griping about the war. “There’s no reason to be doing any of this,” says Bill Mitchell. Higher diesel prices are squeezing his rural building-supply firm. His wife Jane, who runs a horse-boarding farm, fears that the price of fertiliser, which is derived from natural gas, will rise, too.
Democrats are likely to win the House, and need to pick up four seats to win the Senate. Maine could be one. The incumbent, Susan Collins, is a moderate Republican whose campaign barely mentions the president. But she could be swept away by an anti-Trump wave.
Democrats are fired up, judging by turnout in Democratic primaries across the country. Republicans are downbeat. Josh, a veteran browsing camouflage jackets in a military-surplus store in Scarborough, Maine, says he voted for Mr Trump in 2024, and doesn’t care if he turns Iran “into a glass parking lot”. But “everyone’s pissed about the gas prices,” he says.
All battleground states have seen price hikes of 20% or more. In North Carolina, where the Democratic nominee for Senate is a popular ex-governor who has made the cost of living a theme of his campaign, and the Republican is a former oil lobbyist, betting markets give an 80% chance of a Democratic gain.
Mr Trump’s efforts to look on the bright side can come across as insensitive. “The United States is the largest Oil Producer in the World, by far, so when oil prices go up, we make a lot of money,” he posted on March 12th. “I don’t think they’re really concerned about what goes on in the everyday lives of regular people,” complains Theodore, an Uber driver in Georgia, another swing state.
The war’s effects on the global economy—and American politics—depend a lot on how long it lasts. Analysts sympathetic to the administration offer a bullish assessment. The bombing has been precise, killing Iran’s supreme leader on day one and devastating its navy, missile systems and other military assets. The regime is weakened. When the bombing stops, the Iranian people may overthrow it. Or a leader America can do business with may emerge, like Delcy Rodríguez in Venezuela. “If they do co-operate, they will be spared,” says Victoria Coates of the Heritage Foundation, a pro-Trump think-tank.
The economic pain may be severe, but the war will be over in weeks, boosters say. Iran may keep shooting at oil tankers even after America stops bombing, but eventually it will stop; it cannot make enemies of the whole world indefinitely. The result will be that “one of the greatest threats to US, regional and global security” will have seen its weapons programmes set back “for years”, says Matthew Kroenig of the Atlantic Council, a former adviser to Marco Rubio, the secretary of state. “I don’t see it becoming a quagmire,” he adds.
In the short run, the war may benefit Vladimir Putin by raising oil prices, but in the medium term it will enhance American power by demonstrating that the president is prepared to apply force, says Ms Coates. And if oil prices ease before the summer driving season, Republicans’ midterm prospects will not be so grim.
Other conservatives are less sanguine. Fresh from snatching Venezuela’s president, Mr Trump thought doing the same in Iran would be quick and easy, says Kurt Volker, Mr Trump’s former envoy to Ukraine. “Just like Maduro—three hours, and you’re done.” Mr Trump did “an almost incomprehensibly terrible job at explaining to the American people what the hell is going on”, says a Republican operative. He failed to prepare for obvious risks—on March 16th he said “nobody expected” Iran to hit its Gulf neighbours. And he has replaced one Supreme Leader Khamenei with a younger, angrier one whose family America and Israel have just killed; it is not clear this will make Iran less dangerous.
Mr Trump is now in “a horrible position”, says another top Republican. Iran’s drones are cheap to make and costly to shoot down. They threaten slow oil tankers and stationary oil plants. “He has created a problem that is only solved by regime change, and he doesn’t want to [commit ground forces to] do that,” says Mr Volker.
The war has illuminated the cost of mistreating allies, too. Having disparaged NATO and threatened to grab part of Denmark, Mr Trump demanded help from allies he did not consult before starting the war. Refusal would “be very bad for the future of NATO”, he told the Financial Times; yet his pleas went unheeded. His “punitive transactionalism” is “a big part of the reason” why “nobody’s willing” to help America reopen the Strait of Hormuz, says Kori Schake of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank.
The war also complicates America’s relationship with Israel. “Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation, and it is clear that we started this war due to pressure from Israel,” said Joe Kent, a senior counterterrorism official and ardent America Firster, as he resigned on March 17th. Although Mr Trump makes his own decisions, such arguments are common in MAGA world. “My guess would be that they are looking for someone besides their leader to blame for what is not going as successfully as advertised,” says Ms Schake.
Mr Trump may yet snatch kudos from the jaws of calamity. If the war is short and oil prices settle down, voters may be less angry come November. If by that time he has brought three rogue regimes to heel—Venezuela, Iran and perhaps Cuba—he will have much to boast about. But Mr Kent fears the current course leads “toward decline and chaos”.
