It is bubble-gum foreign policy: one where the quick hit of flavor is the goal, rather than chewing a sticky mess for hours. US President Donald Trump’s approach to global adventurism appears to adore a quick result and abhor a protracted crisis.
Little is predictable with this White House, and that is perhaps the point. But the few lessons learned from January’s whirlwind, and indeed Trump’s previous entanglements with Iran, suggest his military options ahead in the Gulf are limited, and far from great.
The buildup of naval assets off and around the coast of Iran is blunt and plodding. Trump has telegraphed potential military action for about 19 days, since he posted “HELP IS ON ITS WAY” and canceled meetings with Iranian officials because of their brutal slaughter of protesters. Back then, he lacked convincing firepower in the region to mount a sizeable assault. That calculus is slowly changing. His June assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities had two carrier groups in the region, more there as a counter-weight to any Iranian reprisals than to be directly involved in the attack. At present, the United States has one carrier group, and multiple other assets, many easily tracked by open-source monitoring.
The buildup has robbed the Pentagon of the element of surprise, but that may not make a huge difference. The Iranian regime has been on high alert, surely, for the seven months since Israel’s wide-ranging and crippling 12-day assault. And while it has surely managed some sort of recovery, its stocks of missiles, and command structure, are without doubt depleted. Trump faces a weakened adversary, but that does not improve his choices. It may in fact complicate them.
Firstly, one lesson of January is that nothing at all might happen. Much analysis of Trump’s outspoken and illegal claims to Greenland suggested he had boxed himself into a corner where he had to act. But his “iron-willed” position folded faster than NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte could whisper the fateful word: “Daddy.”
Often with the 47th president, the show is the goal. He Truths the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in 74 words; he backs down on Greenland with a similar tap of his thumb. And for the fourth time in a month, the world is hanging on every Truth to see if this time, with Iran, it is a FAFO or a TACO.
If Trump feels beholden to military action, the path is rocky. Singular, precise strikes fit the pattern of previous presidential behavior. When Trump takes the military action that his America-first MAGA base is so often averse to, it is usually a mix of impressive and bold execution, with an apparently sober and accurate grasp of the ensuing risks.
Maduro’s capture, the assassination of Quds force chief Qassem Soleimani and the strikes on Iran’s nuclear program all correctly assessed their adversary’s relative inability to defend themselves or strike back. These three operations flexed US military superiority over a brief, but highly potent window: a singular news cycle of undeniable action, seemingly without regard for the aftermath, because really that was not the US’ problem. Trump may have claimed they would “run” Venezuela after Maduro, but evidently had no real plan to do so, bar coercion over the same continued government in Caracas. His top adviser, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, openly admits they have no idea what could follow the demise of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran.
So what would a singular night of targeted and contained US military action look like? They could target what remains of Iran’s leadership: hitting top Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officials, perhaps Khamenei himself – a form of retribution for the tens of thousands of protesters killed by the regime, who Trump incited to rise up and Make Iran Great Again, but who now appear less central to his demands of Tehran.
But the IRGC has reconstituted itself quickly after the 12-day war decimated its ranks. And the path after Khamenei is far from clear. It is deeply unlikely that the octogenarian theocrat would be followed by a young, enlightened democrat. The regime will close ranks for its survival, and any successor will have to prove his anti-American mettle to seal his support from the base. What succeeds Khamenei would likely be worse, as one man is not the entire Iranian system alone.
Another option is going after the remains of Iran’s nuclear program, and this would fit long-term US policy goals. But another strike would risk contradicting Trump’s earlier assessments of success against these facilities in June: why bomb the same thing twice, unless you missed the first time?
Would a wider series of strikes against military and security infrastructure be more effective? Possibly. But bombing campaigns can get less accurate the longer and broader they are. Tens of millions of Iranians rely on the regime for their livelihood, and tens of thousands of fathers and sons serve in the security forces that would be targeted. Orphans and widows do not often accept the wider geopolitical need for their immediate grief. The US risks infuriating a reasonable chunk of the Iranian population it wants to win over, and entrenching the regime it seeks to oust.
The longer and more sustained any bombing campaign, the greater its limitations would be exposed. Iran’s leaders know this is an existential moment for their survival and theocracy, and will continue to prioritise that over all else. A surrender from the smoldering ruins of Tehran’s government buildings remains unlikely: this is a murderous and brutal clan with a dwindling list of allies, whose backs are against the wall.
It is also an enduring fallacy of armchair generals to believe a regime can be bombed out of power – a fact the White House seemed to accept quite readily in the aftermath of Maduro’s capture, when it encouraged his deputy, Delcy Rodriguez, to take over.
Currently Trump lacks the military hardware in theater to entertain weeks of intense bombardment. He may also lack the political will to effect real change by sending in ground forces – a huge, years-long undertaking, which took months to prepare in the case of the ill-fated invasion of Iran’s neighbor Iraq in 2003.
The longer-term and more sustained options unfavorable, Trump is faced with the usual choice between changing the topic and a flashbang moment of military might. He may choose the latter, sensing correctly a weakened Iran. But the good fortune he has enjoyed over the past three lightning strikes – against Iran twice and Venezuela once – risks giving way to hubris and miscalculation. A handful of American soldiers killed by one Iranian missile or drone could drag Trump into months of reprisal warfare, and create another foreign-entanglement headache with his MAGA base for a self-styled president of peace.
And so the options outside of a swift strike narrow: an off-ramp or change the topic? Off-ramps are few here, with an Iranian regime so set on defiance. But Trump’s foreign policy is in the eye of the beholder. His Greenland “off-ramp” has yet to yield an actual concrete change in the US position. But it did successfully kick the crisis out of the headlines, making space for Iran.
These global crises rise and ebb, it seems, as a reminder of the pivotal nature of Trump the man in all things. We look to see whether the thumb goes up, or down, and that show, it appears, is often the goal.
